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at the heart of American education is an ambiguity that we have 
never resolved, in all likelihood cannot and probably should not re-
solve. Is the education of the child fundamentally an extension of 
home, parents, community, and sect? Or is it fundamentally a pro-
cess of socialization into citizenship, into the "public culture," and 
into a set of life choices that transcend the boundaries of one's im-
mediate circumstances? It can be either; for most of us, it is some of 
each; but we aren't likely ever to reach consensus about how much 
it is the one and how much the other. Hence we aren't likely ever to 
settle the profound political controversies that underlie and sur-
round the narrower issues examined in this book. 
THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE. 
By Fred W. Friendlyt and Martha J. H. Elliott.2 New York: 
Random House. 1984. Pp. 339. $17.95. 
Mark Silverstein3 
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama, 
Felix Frankfurter (then America's best known Harvard law profes-
sor) wrote a piece for the Times explaining the meaning and signifi-
cance of the deci~ion.4 Within a few days he received a note from 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone: 
I liked your piece in the Times about the Scottsboro case. I doubt if you realize how 
important it is that judicial action be interpreted to the common man. Just at the 
moment I am getting violent letters from many people who seem to think that in the 
Scottsboro case we passed on the guilt or innocence of the petitioners, and starting 
with that assumption the writers draw the conclusion that the Supreme Court has 
now started out on a course which will afford no protection to the innocent victims 
of assault. 
Frankfurter quickly replied: 
How generous you are in your encouragement, that you should note so modest a 
piece as the one in the Times about the Scottsboro case. When the request for it 
came from the Times, urging the need of a correct exposition of the meaning of the 
decision, I was under great pressure. . . . But just because I feel as strongly as you 
do about the importance of clarifying judicial action to the laity, I felt it in the 
nature of a public duty to yield to the request of the Times. 
Doubtless I do not realize the extent of such a need, certainly as you are made 
to feel it from the correspondence which comes to you from time to time. Indeed I 
I. Edward R. Murrow Professor of Journalism, Columbia University. 
2. Instructor, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. 
3. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University. 
4. Frankfurter, A Notable Decision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1932, § 2, at I. 
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was surprised at the number of letters that the Times piece brought me from other-
wise very intelligent laymen who had queer notions about what was decided until-
at least so they said-they read the Times. s 
The exchange between Frankfurter and Stone points to one of 
the great unknowns of constitutional sociology. How does the pub-
lic come to understand developments in constitutional law? Despite 
attempts by jurists like Hugo Black to make opinions understanda-
ble by all, the number of citizens who take the time and make the 
effort to read important opinions must be infinitesimal. Scholarly 
literature on public law and judicial behavior is often dry and tech-
nical, impenetrable even to many students of the law. To the typi-
cal citizen, the men and women who staff the judiciary remain both 
nameless and faceless. 6 If indeed the Supreme Court is engaged in 
"a continuing colloquy . . . with society at large"7 one might well 
wonder how many of us are really listening. 
We need an intermediary between the Court and the public. 
For Frankfurter that intermediary was the press; for much of his 
judicial career he was in constant communication with the editors 
of America's major newspapers, continually urging better coverage 
of the Court. Years after Frankfurter's death, Hugo Black took a 
much more direct approach. In 1968, when Gallup polls showed a 
marked decline in public respect for the Supreme Court and after a 
newly elected President made the Court a prime campaign issue, 
Black appeared in an unprecedented hour-long interview on CBS. 
Unquestionably one reason for Black's willingness to break with 
tradition was a perceived need to defend the Court and explain its 
actions to the public. In the more recent past, several members of 
the Burger Court have been strikingly candid in their statements to 
reporters. 
The question of how judicial action is interpreted to the public 
is an important one and deserves increased scholarly attention. I 
suspect that one of the most important sources of public education 
is the popular literature of Court and Constitution. The classic of 
the genre is Anthony Lewis's Gideon's Trumpet. An educated guess 
is that for a generation or so the story of Clarence Earl Gideon and 
his battle to secure counsel has been the primary source material on 
the workings of the Supreme Court and the American legal system. 
I still use the book in my introductory courses about American gov-
5. The letters appear in the Felix Frankfurter and Harlan Fiske Stone collections at 
the Library of Congress. 
6. Even law students seem remarkably ignorant about the lives and thoughts of 
Supreme Court Justices. See Bryden, Teaching Constitutional Law: Homage to Clio, 1 
CoNST. CoMM. 131 (1984). 
7. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 240 (1962). 
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ernment and the judicial process. I'm often struck by how many 
students were introduced to the book in high school. What Lewis 
achieved in Gideon was an immensely readable, exciting, human 
story which conveyed to the lay reader a good deal about the 
Supreme Court and constitutional law. Similar works, unfortu-
nately, are all too few.s 
The Constitution: That Delicate Balance seeks to redress that 
deficiency. The authors' goal is to "provide a way for all citizens-
not just lawyers and judges-to take part in the great constitutional 
debates of our time." To further this admirable goal, sixteen essays 
are presented, each about a landmark constitutional case. The 
structure of each essay is basically the same. First the factual his-
tory of the case is developed, then the constitutional background 
and precedents are examined, and finally the decision of the Court 
is explained and its significance determined. There is nothing 
unique in this formula; it has been successfully employed before.9 
What distinguishes this book is the authors' understanding that be-
neath the legal theory and stale drama of constitutional adjudica-
tion are the more human tales of courage and cowardice, strength 
and frailty, wisdom and foolishness. By concentrating on this 
human drama, Friendly and Elliott not only make the landmarks of 
constitutional development more accessible but they give to the 
study of constitutional law and history the vitality it deserves. 
Hence, there is much to be learned from this work, even for the 
constitutional scholar. The discussions of the intricacies of consti-
tutional law are limited but this is to be expected given the book's 
audience and the wide range of issues it attempts to cover. Where 
the book really shines is in its account of the stories behind the 
cases. When possible, the authors interviewed participants in the 
drama. We hear the anger and frustration of Norma McGorvey 
(better known to students of constitutional law as Jane Roe) as she 
recounts a horrible rape and subsequent attempts to secure an abor-
tion. We meet a young admissions officer at the University of Cali-
fornia, Davis, Medical School, uncomfortable with the Davis 
admission policies, who suggests to a rejected applicant, Allan 
Bakke, that he consider questioning the legality of quota-based ad-
missions. We learn that the famous case of DeJonge v. Oregon 
might never have reached the Court but for the efforts of a young 
Portland attorney, Gus J. Solomon, who preferred a Communist 
8. Among the works I would include with Lewis's classic are B. MAHONEY & A. 
WESTIN, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 
(1976); F. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG (1981); P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
9. See, e.g., QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CoNSTITUTION (J. Garraty ed. 
1964). 
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freed as a symbol of American justice rather than jailed as an exam-
ple of capitalist oppression. Years later, Solomon's efforts on behalf 
of the Communist DeJonge would be cited by his foes in a futile 
attempt to block his appointment to the federal bench. 
This is not the stuff found in the typical constitutional law text-
book. But the human stories recounted by Friendly and Elliott are 
as much a part of our constitutional heritage as the words of a Mar-
shall or a Holmes, a Brandeis or a Warren. One might quibble with 
the selection or omission of a case or wish that the essays had been 
arranged in a more logical sequence. But the goal of making the 
Constitution more accessible to the citizenry is a noble one and 
Friendly and Elliott have made an important contribution. 
